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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
(; It1\XT

Sl~O'fT

HASL1\:\I,

Plaintiff and

.Li_ppellant~

vs.
1)1\lTL ll1\ULSEN, P. H. P.r\UL-

SEN,AND BYRON PAULSEN
dba .t\l~~IE l~,RANE RENTAL
c:o~Il)1\NY,
HYRUM PETERSI1:X, THE CORPORATION OF
'fHE PRESIDING BISHOP OF
THE C H U R C H OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
S.i\l~'l"S, a corporation sole, and
li,l{.i\NI( COTTRELL,

No.
9938

Defendan,ts and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Throughout this Brief, all emphasis is ours.

STATE:\IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries to plaintiff
who "~as injured 'vhen he received a charge of elec1
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tricity from a crane boom cable and bucket owned by
defendants Paulsen and operated by their agent, defendant Petersen, while the plaintiff was delivering
ready-mix concrete on premises to which he had been
invited as a business invitee.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. Following a verdict
and judgment for the plaintiff against the respondent
defendants, not including the Church, the trial court
vacated the verdict and judgment and ordered a new
trial. From this order plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT
ON APPEAL.
.
Plaintiff seeks a ru1ing that the trial court's order
granting a new trial was an abuse of its discretion,
and for a reinstatement of the full amount of the
judgment which the trial court vacated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Late in 1959, construction of an L.D.S. chapel
was commenced on Wasatch Boulevard just south of
Thirteenth South. The property was owned by the
Church and the Church itself was the builder. On or
about December 18, 1959, at the request of the Church,
three 7200 volt power lines were installed on the premises carried by utility poles from a point on the north
side of Thirteenth South. The poles were erected on a
line more or less north and south until they reached
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npproxirnately .>:! feet frorn the buil<ling foundation.
Frorn this point the line continued to a pole a distance
of tiO feet in a \Vest south,vest direction. Four "·ires.
anchored hy the top cross bars on the poles, ran side
by side. 'rhe line on the south side and the two north
Jines \rere }iYe. rfhe other line WaS neutral, and each of
the three liYe lines carried 7~00 volts (R. 194) and were
exposed and uninsulated. (R. 196). They were approxirnately :!() to :!7 feet above the ground. (R. 195, 337) .
. : \ n1onth after the lines were installed, the L~hurch
ordered so1ne ready-mix concrete from Utah Sand and
(~-ravel l'lornpany, to be delivered in the latter company's trucks and by its personnel. The Church also
arranged 'vith defendant, Acme Crane Rental Company, to furnish a crane, a crane operator and an oiler
to lift the ready-mix concrete from the delivery trucks
to the foundation of that part of the building which
\Vas adjacent to the high voltage wires. Defendant,
Frank (..,ottrell, an employee of the Church, was the
foreman in charge of the operation and he and defendant. Hyrum Petersen, the crane operator, conferred
as to "·here to put the crane for the concrete lift job.
'fhey both knew of the exposed high voltage 'vires and
because of the proximity of the wires to the area where
the concrete '"as to be poured, they discussed the problein of "·here the crane should be placed. (R. 353-35~,
389-390) . The crane had a sixty-foot boom with a 30foot jib extension ( R. 356) from 'vhich a cable hung .
. .-\ bucket "~as attached to the end of the cable for
carrying the concrete. Cottrell and Petersen agreed
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that the only place to put the crane was between the
wires and the foundation forms, and that is where it
was placed. ( R. 353-354, 366, 385-389) . The distance
between the wires and the forms was approximately 40
feet. (Exhibit 2 D) . They further agreed to, and in
fact did, proceed with the unloading of the concrete
without arranging for the de-energizing of the south
wire which could have been done without depriving the
workmen of necessary power. (R. 354, 196). Although
the south line could have been insulated in two and
one-half to three hours time with fibre eels (R. 196198, Exhibit 3 P), Petersen and Cottrell proceeded
with the unloading operation without insulating any
of the wires against the danger that they knew existed
( R. 390) ; and, finally, they proceeded to allow the
invitee truck drivers, including plaintiff, to come into
the danger zone without warning them of the dangerous
nature of the area into which they were invited to
unload their concrete. (R. 354, 248). The defendant
Petersen, as Paulsen's agent, also proceeded to operate
the crane with the boom swinging over to, and making
contact with, the wire in an arc capable of extending
several score feet beyond the wire (R. 401, and Map
Exhibit 2D), even though he knew that the safety custom of crane operators was never to let any part of
the crane or boom get within eight feet of a utility
wire ( R. 397) , and also even though he knew it was
impossible for him to see and have a clear vision of
the cable when it came close to the wire. (R. 405-406,
423-424) . Defendants Paulsen had furnished the
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Church \rith an oiler whose job, among other things.
was to nssist the crane operator and people delivering
conl'tTte for pouring and to keep the operation safe.
(It 4:~:!. :!:J7. 383-38-t). But when the l~ tab Sand and
( ;raYel drivers, including plaintiff, arrived and unloaded, this oiler \vas not at the scene of the electrical
danger to assist. ( R. ~-t8).

In such restricted area for a 90-foot boom to operate, the defendant, Hyrum Petersen, commenced
unloading ready-tnix concrete between noon and 1 :00
p.n1. on Jan nary 19, 1960. ( R. 206, 366) . The trucks
had been loaded at the Utah Sand and Gravel Company's X orth Plant on Beck Street, and its employees,
the drivers of the trucks, had received their orders from
the con1pany's North Plan,t personnel as to where to
deliver the concrete. 'fhe driver of the truck carrying
the first load "·as Dave
alker (R. 355, 390), who
backed his truck up to a point underneath the exposed
high voltage wires. He was not aware that he was near
any "·ires, nor, of course, that they were of high voltage
and exposed. ( R. 208) .
''Thile '\Talker "·as unloading~ the plaintiff drove
onto the site "·ith the next load of concrete to be unloaded. He drove in from Thirteenth South, turned
his truck to the "·est, then backed it up so that he was
facing north and ready to back up as soon as
alker
"·as finished. (R. 242-243). He waited for approximately 10 to 15 minutes and remained in the truck
\vhere it "·as 'varm. It "·as a cold day and plaintiff
kne,,· of no reason to get out of the truck. (R. 249,

''r

''r

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

212) . Then, after Walker pulled out, plaintiff backed
his truck up in the same path along which Walker had
driven. He also did not see the wires because like
Walker, he had to concentrate on spotting the truck
to the bucket, 'vhich took his complete attention. (R.
247-248, 207) . They both backed up by use of the side
view mirrors and the terrain was uneven. ( R. 243, 207) .
Neither the poles nor the wires were within the view
of their side view mirrors, nor had they become aware
of the wires from any other view. (R. 247, 208). After
backing to the point indicated by the place where the
bucket rested, plaintiff got out of the truck, went to
the back thereof, and swung the pouring chute from
the east side of the truck, where it had been fastened, to
a point where it could pour into the bucket. But the
chute, thus extended out from the truck, was approximately one foot short of the bucket. (R. 244, 248).
The crane operator, Hyrum Petersen, then caused the
bucket to be swung closer to the truck but in doing
so the bucket went too far and struck the truck. (R.
246). Plaintiff, who was standing on the ground at
the west side of the chute, involuntarily and spontaneously reached for the bucket to push it away from,
and to the south of, the back end of the truck where it
had just made momentary contact. (R. 246, 451). As
he grabbed the lip of the bucket with his right hand
to push it away from the truck (R. 246), he received
an electrical charge. ( R. 246, 249) . The cable holding
the bucket extending from the 90-foot boom had made
contact with the south 7200 volt wire. ( R. 210, 211).
6
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}l(aintitl' n1ornentarily remained conscious just long
t·nough to n1ake a tre1nendous effort to break loose
frorn the juice (It. 249) and he also remembers falling
bat·k,ranls and lighting on the frozen ground on his
left shoulder before losing consciousness. (R. ~49). He
'ras 'vearing rubber overshoes or galoshes (R. 249) and
he also had rubber soles on his shoes. (R. 457). His
hands \Vere protected by gloves. (R. 249, 252). The
truck. of course, had rubber tires, and it is conjectured
that these protections prevented plaintiff from getting
the fu 11 force of the 7200 volts, which otherwise, presunlably \vould haYe caused his immediate death.

Dave '\Talker, who had been cleaning the pouring
chute of his truck, ran over to the plaintiff ( R. 209) ,
and he describes him as unconscious, with the pupils of
his eyes rolled back so that only the whites of his eyes
\\'ere seen. ( R. 209) . He also said that the bucket was
just above the ground, that a blue flame was running
frorn the bucket to the ground, and that the cable was in
contact "·ith the utility wire. (R. 210). He then saw the
crane operator., Hyrum Petersen, pull the cable and
bucket a"·ay from the wire and thus break the electrical
contact. (R. 211). ,.fhe crane itself was on rubber wheels
and also resting on out-riggers. (R. 398, 273). Breaking
the contact before he stepped to the ground from the
crane undoubtedly saved Mr. Petersen from getting the
electrical current. ( R. 425-426) .
Plaintiff soon regained consciousness and after
son1e delay "\vas driven to see Dr. Silas Smith at South
Temple and Fifth East. Plaintiff was able to get around
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under his own power. (R. 452). His hands were burned
(R. 250-251), and he had pain in his left shoulder. (R.
250, 453). He was examined, X-rays were taken, and
his burns were treated. (R. 250). He returned to the
doctor next day (R. 250, 252) and he continued to see
Dr. Smith until April 1, 1960, making about 12 visits
during that time. (R. 252). While making these visits,
plaintiff continued to work, but it was difficult and painful and he was given limited duties on the job. (R. 254).
Dr. Smith, in diagnosing the source of P.laintiff's continued pain, told him that he had arthritis in his shoulder
and that is was something he would have to live with.
(R. 252, 340, 382). For the next several months plaintiff did live with the pain thinking there was nothing he
could do about it. (R. 340). But the pain continued to
get worse ( R. 340) , his left arm and shoulder were getting smaller (R. 262), and in November, 1960, (R. 254255) he decided to seek further medical help. (R. 340,
262) . After spending a month or two with a chiropractor, he saw his family doctor, Dr. Wilson, who sent
him to Dr. Pemberton, an orthopedic specialist. (R. 297298). Plaintiff gave Dr. Pemberton the history or source
of his injury as of January 19, 1960, 'vhen he received
the charge of electricity and was thrown on his left
shoulder and said that his injury had caused him to have
pain in his shoulder which had been getting worse. (R.
298). Dr. Pemberton observed a prominence of the outer
aspect of the left ciavicle or collar bone. There was
tenderness over the joint between the collar bone and
the shoulder blade, and over the front end of the shoul-
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der and out to the outer aspect. 'rhere was weakness in
lifting the arn1 up and sotne restriction of motion in
pulling it straight up into the air. (R. 298). After some
prelirninary treatn1ent, Dr. Pemberton recommended
surgery (R. 1~~) which he performed on or about
l•'ebruary 8, 1961. He found that the pain was caused by
( 1) an inflamed bursa under the deltoid muscle, the
n1usele that lifts the arm out and forms a cap over the
top of the shoulder ( R. 299) , and ( 2) adhesions or scar
tissue 'vhich had formed between the muscle layers and
the bone ligaments about the ball or joints between the
collar bone and the shoulder blade. ( R. 301) . This scar
tissue occurred from a jerking and strain on the attachment of the muscles and created inflammation or perioarthritis about the joint. (R. 301).
Dr. Pemberton "·as able to remove the inflamed bursa
and thus remove the cause of the pain from that source
(R. 300) but there "·as nothing that surgery or any
kno"·n treatment could do to eliminate the pain from
the adhesions. (R. 301). Both Dr. Smith and Dr. Pemberton believed that this latter pain would remain during
plaintiff's lifetime. (R. 301, 340, 382). Dr. Pemberton
n1akes specific reference to the plaintiff's injuries which
occurred on January 19, 1960, as the source of his disability (R. 302, 318), and suggests that the muscle damage may haYe occurred from a jerking or contracting
of the muscles '"hen they were stimulated by the electrical impulse rather than from a jar or fall. (R. 301,
31-t 320). He estimates a 10 to 15 per cent permanent
9
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partial disability of the arm at the shoulder due to
muscle weakness. (R. 303) .
Plaintiff was unable to work for three months following the operation. (R. 257). His left arm had shrunk
to about the size of his wrist and during his convalescence he performed certain exercises to restore as much
as possible the muscles and the normal size of his arm.
(R. 257-259). Among the things he did to help build
up his arm was to assist in a very limited way in some
construction work which he had contracted out in the
building of an addition to his home. l-Ie undertook this
upon the recommendation of the doctor. (R. 289-290,
337-338, 456) . While the effect of the operation has
been to reduce the pain in his shoulder and arm, it has
not eliminated it. His efforts to restore his muscles
during convalescence was accompanied with much pain
(R. 259-260}, and upon his return to work as a truck
driver, he was again forced to use his shoulder and arm
muscles, and such use was constantly associated with
pain (R. 259-261), although not so great as before the
operation. (R. 259-260). Inasmuch as the pain is not as
constant and intense now as it was before the operation,
plaintiff believes the operation was very beneficial. (R.
262-263) . Nevertheless, plaintiff can avoid much of the
pain only by not using his arm and shoulder muscles, and
he has chosen to use them to he extent required by his
work, and to the extent required to keep, as much as
possible, a healthy and normal size arm and shoulder.
As as result of such use he has suffered, he does suffer,
and will continue to suffer pain; the more he uses his
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urn1 and shoulder. the n1ore they pain hi1n; the less he

tlu:rn, the n1ore the n1uscles atrophe and ''waste
:nvny'' on hitn. (Unnumbered page between R. 261 and
uses

:!ti:!).

I I is pains and disabilities have had certain effects
on his daily life and activities 'vhich Inay be listed as

follows:
1. l-Ie reduced the amount of working time as an
employee of Utah Sand and Gravel Company as much
as it was possible and still keep his job (R. 260), which
resulted in an annual wage loss of approximately
*HJ7.00. (Exhibit 16 P).
Prior to January 19, 1960, he }jked his work, even
overtin1e hours, 'vhich he could have to any extent
desired because of his seniority (R. 241), but he changed
to not liking his 'vork at all because of the pain associated
\vith his work. (R. 260). He avoided overtime hours
\rhen it \vas possible. ( R. 260) .
:!.

3. Finally he took another job on the suggestion of
his doctor ( R. 20~) , "~hich resulted in less pay than the

reduced amount he had most recently been earning as a
truck driver.
4 ....-\.t home he has become nervous and irritable

\vith his "·ife and children and prone to "blow up over
little things that never bothered him before," as if he
didn ·t ha Ye any control over it. ( R. 263, 350) .
5. His sleeping, which had been "sound and still,"

changed to a condition of constant "turning and jerking around, just moving all night.'' (R. 350-351).
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6. He used to enjoy bowling as a recreation, but
now he no longer enjoys it and avoids it. (R. 349, 35I).

As a hunter he became considerably limited in what he
could do. (R. 340, 348).
7. He is now unable and restricted in doing, or is

not inclined to do, the chores and work around his home.
(R. 348).
8. He avoids stripping to the waist in public in

sport situations where it is customary to do such for he
is self-conscious about the large incisional scar resulting from the operation. (R. 349, Exhibits 10 P, II P,
12 P).
He cannot now trust his arm and shoulder to lift
things above his head. (Unnumbered page between

R. 261-262).
10. He cannot rest any object on his left shoulder

because of the pain from contact with the bony prominence at the joint due to the muscle atrophe. (Unnumbered page between R. 255-256, R. 320) .
The foregoing are the results of a fixed and permanent condition, the central feature of which is pain in
the shoulder and arm when they are used.
When plaintiff was injured in January, 1960, he
was a young man of 26 years, a high sch~ol graduate
as of June, 1951, married and the father of three young
children. Since then they have had one more child. (R.
239). His occupational experience since high school has
been limited (except for a year's work at Dugway,
where he operated heavy equipment) to his work for
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{Ttah Sand and (;ravel l.,o1npany, driving ready-mix
trucks. I I e had built up good seniority by the tin1e of
the aecident. lie "·as the 11th or 1:Zth in seniority out of
~30 or .>.> n1en. ( R. 240). He "·as not skilled in any other
work. lie liked his \Vork as a truck driver driving readyrnix trueks and, prior to his injuries, liked to, and did,
aeeept as tnuch overtime work as he could get, 'vhich
'rork "·as generously available for him because of his
seniority. (R. i40-241}.
'fhe mortality tables show his life expectancy fron1
the titne of the trial \vhen he was 29 years old to be
approximately from 40 to 44 years.
His wage loss in 1961, the year of his operation, as
compared \rith 1959, his last normal year, was $1381.00.
(It 264-:!09, 347-348, Exhibit 16 P). This is figured
by using his 1962 wage rate as a norm.
All during 196:! plaintiff was as well and as fully
recovered as he "'"ill ever be, and his wage loss that year
\\·as $U57.00 (R. 264-269, 347-348, Exhibit 16 P), as
con1pared with his last normal year of 1959. Note the
similarity
. of his income in 1957, 1958 and 1959. Plaintiff's 19{)2 'vage loss is arrived at by using his rate of
hourly \vage in 1962 for all years figured, and charting
such income fron1 the hours actually worked.
Plaintiff's special damages amounted to $558.80
but plaintiff's counsel neglected to ask Dr. Smith if
$101.50 charged by him together 'vith X-rays taken
under his auspices 'vere reasonable, so the court reduced
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the special damage to $457.30 which was the amount
that Dr. Pemberton accounted for. (R. 303-304).
At the close of the evidence, each of the defendants
presented certain motions to the court. Some motions
were granted, others were denied. (R. 479-492). Among
the motions made by the defendants Paulsen and Petersen, was a motion to dismiss plaintiff's action upon two
grounds:
I. That plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a

matter of law in failing to examine the place where he
unloaded the truck. ( R. 479) .
2. 'That plaintiff failed to prove at the time of the

accident that defendant Petersen, the crane operator,
was an employee of Paulsens'; that in fact plaintiff was
a servant of the Church. ( R. 480) .
These defendants also moved the court
"to strike from the record all testimony relating to loss of earnings on the part of plaintiff,
past or future, all exhibits on special damage,
testimony relating to Dr. Pemberton's treatment
and operation charges, including hospital bills,
and all claims that plaintiff has for permanent
disability or pain arising from Dr. Pemberton's
operation and treatment of plaintiff." (R. 491).
As to the motion to dismiss, the court saw no merit
to either of the grounds given and denied the motion.
(R. 481-482, 486). As to the motion to strike, the
court denied that motion, but expressed serious reservations as to his ruling, and invited defendants to move
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the verdict
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did not satisfy thcrn. (It. 492). In n1aking this recomrnerulation, the court added its own vie'v that because
plaintiff did not return to Dr. Smith for further treattnent, but instead \Vent to other doctors following the
19()0 deer hunt, the jury could infer that his injury
oct·urred at that time rather than in January. The court
bases this observation upon Dr. Smith's statement as
related by the court:
"I told hin1 if this continued to hurt him to
eon1e in and see me." ( R. 491-493) .
X either respondent moved for a directed verdict,
hut the Paulsens did request instructions covering their
objections on grounds which were the basis of their
n1otions for judgment n.o.v.
In its instructions the court presented the jury with
special interrogatories and the jury made the following
specific findings ( R. 142-145) :
1. That each defendant was negligent.

2. That defendant Petersen's negligence was the

proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that defendants Paulsen "·ere also proximately responsible because
Petersen "·as their agent acting within the scope of his
employment.
3. That each defendant was guilty of wanton and

reckless conduct.
~.

That plaintiff 'Yas not contributorily negligent.

That plaintiff's special damages amounted to
~.>58.80. and his general damages amounted to
5.

$50,000.00.
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In submitting its special interrogatories it appears
that the court did not give the jury an opportunity to
answer specifically whether the Church's negligent conduct was also a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Since the jury did not, therefore, make such a finding
the Church moved the court for judgment in favor of
the Church and against plaintiff, "no cause of action."
(R. 148-149). Judgment was accordingly entered in
favor of the Church. (R. 150-151).
Responding to plaintiff's motion for judgment,
the court entered judgment in his favor and against the
Paulsens and Petersen in the sum of $50,457.30, and
also entered judgment in the same amount in favor of
the Paulsens and against the defendant Petersen. (R.
166-167).

Following the verdict and the judgment, respondents moved the court to grant judgment in favor of
the defendants, respectively, and against plaintiff of
"no cause of action" non obstante verdicto on the specific grounds that
"as a matter of law, the evidence showed the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was workmen's compensation'', and
"As a matter of law, the evidence showed that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in proxinlately causing his own injury, and likewise, as
a matter of law, plaintiff failed to show wanton
and wilful! misconduct". (R. 157, 164-165).
In connection with this motion, respondents also
moved for a remittitur of all special damages and
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*

the general darnages. 'fhe court refused
to grant these n1otio11s. (R. 1~>7, 16-t-1()~3}.
tH,OOO.OO of

Itespondents also n1oved the court, pursuant to
l{ule 50 (b), to set aside the verdict and judgment on
the t'vo grounds listed above and the further ground

that
H~ \s

a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence any
darnages, except general damages for the pain
and the burn on hands or the bruise on his shoulder." (R. 157, 164-165}.
Respondents also filed a motion for a new trial
upon the following grounds:
I. Excessive damages appearing to have been

given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict, and that it is against law.
3. Error in la"~. (R. 159, 162).
These latter two motions were granted as appears
in the following Order:

"I'I' IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJlTDC;.ED AXD DECREED that the verdict
herein and the judgment entered thereon in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, Paul
Paulsen, P. H. Paulsen and Byron Paulsen,
dba Acme Crane Rental Company, and the defendant, Hyrum Petersen, on April 24, 1963,
be set aside and vacated as against the defendants Paul Paulsen, P. H. Paulsen and Byron
Paulsen and Hyrum Petersen, and the verdict
and judgment against these defendants are
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hereby set aside and vacated, and the defendants,
Paul Paulsen, P. H. Paulsen and Byron Paulsen, dba Acme Crane Rental Company, and the
defendant, Hyrum Petersen's motion for a new
trial on issues of liability and damages is hereby
granted.
Dated this 15th day of May, 1963.
Merrill C. Faux, Judge" (R. 171)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE
SUPPOR'l"'S 'rHE
FINDINGS:
(I)
THAT
DEFENDANT,
HYRUM PETERSEN, WAS NEGLIGENT;
(2) THAT PLAINTI~,F WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT; (3) THAT
DEFENDANT PETERSEN'S NEGLIGENT
CONDUCT WAS THE PROXI}IIATE CAUSE
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES; (4) THAT
DEFENDANT
PETERSEN'S
CONDUCT
WAS ALSO WANTON AND RECKLESS;
AND (5) THAT PLAIN'l"'IFF WAS INJURED
BY DEFENDANT HYRUM PETERSEN
WHILE SAID DEFENDANT WAS ACTING AS AGENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS
PAULSEN AND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
HIS EMPLOYMENT.
A case unusually similar as to the essential factual
elements of this case is Johanson vs. Cudahy Packing
Company, 107 Utah 114, cited in 69 ALR 2nd 170.
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In the trial court a motion to distniss the complaint
was granted. ,-fhere "·as~ therefore, no trial and the
appeal \ras taken on the strength of the allegations in
the co1nplaint. 'fhe action 'vas to recover for the death
of a truck driYer 'vho was delivering a load of salt to
Cudahy. llis death occurred when the truck he was
driYing n1ade contact with a live, uninsulated electric
\rire stretched across an alleyway as the deceased was
backing up the truck to the point where delivery was
to be made. Factual details of importance as well as
the Ia"· "·ith respect to business visitors are contained
in the following excerpt from the court's opinion:
"The complaint alleges that the deceased was
delivering a load of salt which the defendant
had ordered from the deceased's employer. Drivers delivering goods purchased by the occupier
of premises are invitees. * * * The best statement of the liability of the occupier of premises
to"·ard an inYitee which has come to our attention may be found in Bohlen, 'Studies in the
La"· or Torts', page 183. The rule is there stated
as follows:
'The position of the 'business guest' is some"·hat better than that of the 'bare licensee'.
1
' ' hile the owner is bound to disclose to both
any defect of which he knows and which he
should recognize as creating a risk of injury
to either, he may assume that the bare licensee,
knowing that the owner has no interest in his
visit and, therefore, cannot be expected to have
tnade special preparations for his coming, will
be on the alert to discover for himself the true
condition of the premises; 'vhile a business
guest, being entitled to expect to find the
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premises put in order for his visit, is not to be
expected to discover defects unusual in a
properly prepared business premises. And
the owner having an interest in the business
invitee's visit, must by inspection ascertain
the actual condition of the premises, so that
ignorance due to a failure in inspection will
not excuse his failure to give warning, while
he owes no such duty to a bare licensee, it being immaterial that it would cost the owner a
very slight effort to make an effective inspection and that it would be impossible for the
licensee to make such an inspection in the
course of his very temporary use of the premises'.
"Here the defective portion of the premises
consisted of the very approach which was prepared by the defendant for the deceased's use.
The deceased_, as an invitee_, had the right to expect to find the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and t'lhould not be expected to discover
defects unusual in a properly prepared business
premises. The alleged defect does not arise from
a natural condition of the lands. It is true that
if the defective or dangerous condition is obvious
so that any reasonably prudent person would
be expected to see it and appreciate its danger,
the occupier of the land would not be negligent
in failing to warn said person of said defect or
danger. But it does not appear from the allegations of the complaint that these wires were so
located that any reasonable person backing a
truck through the alley,vay 'vould be reasonably
expected to see them, or if he saw them_, to assume
that they were highly dangerous. * * * It also
appears that these wires were above eye levelthat is, that they were approximately 11 feet
20
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frotn the ground. Under these circu1nstances,

nre not prepared to hold that the defendant
had no duty to "·arn the deceased of the presence
of these \rires and of their high voltage or that
deceased could be held as a matter of la\v to be
guilty of contributory negligence".
\Ve

"It likewise cannot be said that the defendant
\Vas free from negligence in permitting this dangerous condition to exist as distinguished from
the mere failure to warn. This approach was prepared for the very purpose for which the decea~ed teas usiny it. He had the right to e(rpcct
the defendant to inspect it and to prepare for his
cotniny. One cannot with prudence maintain a
highl/f dangerous condition on a portion of the
pre 111 ises "loh ich business invitees are expected to
usc and travel. It is dangerous and negligent
to mai·ntain a high voltage wire across an approach at such a low level that persons re~on
ably expected to travel there ~ business invitees
rcill come in contact with it. This would be dangerous even though it was obvious and even
though a re~onably prudent person would be
l\l'pccted to see it. Of course, in nearly every
case 'vhere the occupier of land warned the invitee of the presence of danger, he could escape
liability for any ensuing injury happening to
the invitee thereafter. Anyone knowing of the
existence of the danger and proceeding anyway
n1ight under certain conditions be guilty of contributory negligence. * * * But the mere fact
that these 'vires might have been so located that
the deceased should have seen them did not disclose that the defendant was free from all negligence in maintaining the wires across this approach. * * * "
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In the case of Kelley vs. Summers, 210 Fed. 2nd
665, 672, lOth Circuit (Kansas), 1954, two men, Jones
and.Martin, were victims of an electrical current. Defendant, Kelley, sought to escape liability on the ground
of contributory negligence on the part of Jones and
Martin.
"The point," said the court, "is amplified by
the argument that Jones and Martin had the
clearest view and opportunity to observe the high
tension line and to avoid the danger by simply
dropping their hold on the hooks and that their
failure to keep a proper lookout and assert reasonable care to avoid danger constituted negligence on their part. W ray was operating the
tractor and boo1n. It was his duty to know the
position of the boom_, to exercise reasonable care
in observing co·nditions immediately adjacent to
the boom_, to exercise reasonable care to discover
the presence of the high tension line_, and to exercise like care to preve·nt .the boom coming into
contact with the wire. The duties of Jones and
Martin were to place the hooks in the ends of
the pipe lying on the ground, to guide the pipe
when elevated to its position on the truck, and
then to disengage the hooks from the pipe. It
was not their duty or responsibility to keep a
lookout to see that the boom did not come into
contact with a high tension wire or other object
above the work being done. * * * "
In the Kelley vs. Summers case it appears that the
men who received the charge had the better opportunity
to see the wires if they had been looking for them. But
their job was such as to keep their attention otherwise
occupied, and this prevented their being contributorily
negligent.
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But suppose a case where a plaintiff knew of the
wires, and in fact had worked in close proximity thereto
for several weeks. Such is the situation in Erbes vs.
lJnion Electrical Company, 353 SW 2nd 659, (Mo.),
IHti:!. 'rhis \vas an action for injuries sustained by a
construction worker when a cable he was holding contacted the defendant-electrical company's overhead subtranstnission line. The wires were in plain sight, the
plaintiff and other workmen all worked around and
under the wires and knew of the wires. However, the
plaintiff's foreman said he did not know the wires carried
electricity or that they were uninsulated or that they
\vere high-voltage wires. A plaintiff admitted that he
had seen the wires but did not know that they were
uninsulated and didn't think they carried electricity,
nlthough he said he would not have touched them
deliberately. He had worked on the job in the vicinity
of the 'vires for about five weeks. Plaintiff recovered
a judgment and it "'as affirmed on appeal.
In Brown Ys. Arrington Construction Company,
262 }:lac 2nd 789, cited at 69 ALR 2nd 182, (Idaho) ,
1953, the plaintiff was not a business invitee and he
kne'v of the power line and of its danger when he
approached the area where the machinery was working
near the power line. Even so, the court upheld his
recoYery for damages. In that case the defendant was
hired by the county to remove debris from a canal over
"·hich a new bridge was to be constructed. The county
loaned one of its employees to the defendant to operate
the crane and drag line. The canal ran north and south,
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the road, east and west. There was a power line 28 feet
above ground carrying 7200 volts of electricity on the
south side of the road also running east and west. The
crane was placed in a position south of the road and
under the power line. It had a 40-foot boom. The plaintiff was sent by the county with a road grader to build
a detour around the bridge site so that the flow of traffic
would be uninterrupted during bridge construction
operations. The crane was east of the canal. About noon
plaintiff completed his job and drove the grader a short
distance east of the work area and then on foot returned,
and approached the drag line. At this point there is a
conflict in the testimony as to whether the drag line was
then in operation. It was Brown's testimony that it was
not and that the bucket was on the ground when he
approached. He said that he knew it was dangerous
to approach the drag line when it was in operation
under the power line. After talking briefly with Skinner, the drag line opera tor, he started to leave. As he
left Skinner put the drag line in operation and moved
the bucket. "Brown saw a corner of the drag line suddenly seem to be afire. Contact was made, not knowingly, between Brown and the drag line and he was
knocked unconscious and thrown to the ground."
The foregoing cases entirely support the validity
of the verdict as to the defendants' negligence and as
to the absence of contributory negligence on plaintiff's
part. As to the latter proposition, we offer the following
reasons:
1. As a business invitee plaintiff was entitled to
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expect that the pren1ises 'vere safe for the purpose for
which he had been invited.
~.

.
w1res.

He, in fact, did not know of the existence of the

:~.If

he had seen the wires, he would not have known
they "·ere dangerous, and having seen them, unless some
faet had come to his attention indicating that the defendants had not made the wires safe, plaintiff was entitled
to expect that they were safe.
'I'hat plaintiff's position as a business invitee gives
hint this protection is emphasized also in the Restatement of Torts, Section 343:
'\-\ possessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
(a) Knows, or by his exercise of reasonable
care could discover, the condition which, if known
to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and
(b) Has no reason to believe that they will
discover the condition or realize the risk involved
therein, and
(c) Invites or permits them to enter or remain
upon the land without exercising reasonable care
(i) to make the condition reasonably
safe or

(ii) to give warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm. * * .':
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In comment (d) the restaters state: "A business visitor is entitled to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the
actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonably safe by
repair, or to warn of the actual condition and the
risk involved therein. Therefore_, a business visitor is not required to be on the alert to discover
defects * * * . This is of importance in determining whether the visitor is or is not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to discover a defect. * * * ."
In view of plaintiff's ignorance of the wires, of the
lack of notice of danger even if he had seen the wires,
of defendants' high degree of responsibility to plaintiff
to give him warning and of plaintiff's right to rely upon
the defendant to give a warning when there is danger,
and in view of the law as above set forth, we submit
that the evidence in this case fully and amply support
the findings by the jury that respondents were negligent, the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and
that the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries.

DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT COMES WITHIN
THE DEFINITION OF RECKLESS AND
'VANrfON CONDUCT
The jury also found that defendants' conduct was
reckless and wanton. The pertinent facts on this issue
are that all of the defendants, either directly or through
their agents, knew of the danger and then deliberately
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failed either to correct the situation or to give plaintiff
any ,rarning of the danger. ~rhe Restatement of Torts,
Section 500, reads as follows:
H'['he actor's conduct is in reckless disregard
of the safety of another if he intentionally does
nn aet or fails to do an act which it is his duty to
the other to do, knowing or having reason to
kno\v the facts which would lead a reasonable
tnan to realize that the actor's conduct not only
creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him."
''Special Note: The conduct described in this
section is often called 'wanton or wilful misconduct' both in statutes and judicial opinions."
''COMMENT:

*

*

*

*

"c. In order that the actor's conduct may be
reckless, it is not necessary that he himself recognize it as being extremely dangerous. His
inability to realize the danger may be due to his
reckless temperament or to the abnormally favorable results of previous conduct of the same
sort. It is enough thaat he knows or has reason
to know of circumstances which would bring
home to the realization of the orcpnary, reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his
conduct.
·'d. If the actor's conduct is such as to involve
a high degree of chance that serious harm will
result from it to anyone who is within range of
its effect, the fact that he knows or has reason
to know that others are within such range is conclusive of the recklessness of his conduct toward
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them. It is, however, not necessary that the
actors should know that there is anyone within
the area made dangerous by his conduct. It is
enough that he knows that there is strong probability that others may rightfully come within
such zone.
"e. * * * In order that the breach of such
statute shall constitute reckless disregard for the
safety of those whose protection it is enacted,
the statute must not only be intentionally violated but the precautions required must be such
that their omission will be recognized as involving a high degree of probability that serious
harm 'viii result * * * .
"f. Reckless conduct differs from intentional
wrong doing in a very important particular.
While an act to be reckless must be intended by
the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the
harm which results from it. It is enough that he
realizes or, from facts which he knows, should
realize that there is a strong probability that
harm may result, even though he hopes or even
expects that his conduct will prove harmless.

***

"g. Reckless conduct differs from negligence
in several important particulars. It differs from
that form of negligence which consists in mere
inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a
failure to take precautions to enable the actor
adequately to cope with a possible or probable
future emergency in that reckless misconduct
requires a conscious choice of a course of action
either with knowledge of the serious danger to
others involved in it or with knowledge of facts
which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. * * * "
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This seetion of the Restate1nent is cited with approval in Ferguson vs. J ongsma, 10 Utah 2nd 179.
l t is also cited with approval in Idaho as appears from
the Utah ease of \\rood vs ,.fay lor, 8 Utah 2nd 210.
\ \yhen the defendants knowingly and deliberately
placed and 'vorked the crane so close to 7200 volt wires
\rhich 'vere live and uninsulated, knowing that plaintiff
and others whom they had invited for their, the defendants', business interest would be exposed to great and
substantial harm of the type which in fact did occur,
then such conduct comes within the definition of reckless
and ":anton conduct.

DEFENDANTS P AULSENS' RESPONSIBILITIES AS BUSINESS INVITORS ARE
THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE CHURCH
Paragraph 383 of the Restatement (Torts) reads:
"One who does an act or carries on an activity
upon land on behalf of the possessor thereof, is
subject to the same liability, and enjoys the
same immunity from liability, for bodily harm
caused thereby to others within and outside the
land as though he were the possessor of the
land.

"COMMENT:
"a. The words 'acting on behalf of the possessor' are used to indicate that the person in
question is acting not only for the purpose of the
possessor but also by his direction or consent and
therefore by his direction or consent and therefore by his authority. One acting on behalf of
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the possessor may do so as a servant or as an
independent contractor."
POINT II
THE
EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE
FINDINGS THAT 'l.,HE SERVICES, OPERATION AND TREATMENT PERFORMED
BY DR. PEMBERTON WERE FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIF.,F ON
JANUARY I9, I960, AS A RESULT OF 1,HE
NEGLIGENT CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS
PETERSEN AND PAULSEN.
We come now, under Point II, to two of the reasons
for the new trial order of the court. A third reason will
be discussed under Point III. Inasmuch as the court
did not give reasons for its action in the Order itself,
we felt somewhat obligated to present the matters discussed under Point I.
Nevertheless, from what the trial court has said,
both on and off the record, its only reasons for granting
a new trial, together with our comments thereon are as
follows:
I. That the plaintiff, in the court's view, did not

produce adequate medical testimony to show that Dr.
Pemberton treated the plaintiff for injuries received
on January I9, I960.
To support this theory, the court observes that after
April I, I960, plaintiff did not go back to Dr. Smith
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although Dr. Srnith testified: "I told hi1n if it continues
to hurt hin1 to come in.'' (It. 492) . Thereafter, plaintiff
sa\v no doctors until November (R. 255) 'vhen he went
to doctors other than Dr. Smith. 'l.,he court believed
that it 'vas possible during this period from April to
Xovember that some other injury may have caused the
trouble Dr. Pen1berton treated, and that one possibility
"'as that plaintiff was injured anew while deer hunting.
( ){. :J4!0, lines 8-12) . The court, in support of this
theory, refers to the case of Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah
~d 16. (R. 49:!). 'I.,he court was so concerned about this
problem that it seriously considered directing a verdict
in fa,·or of the defendants, but then decided to submit
the case to the jury, but only after it had invited defendant to file motions for judgment, notwithstanding the
,·erdict. if the judgment was "not to the liking of
defendants." The verdict was "not to the liking of defendants," and respondents did file motions for judgment
n.o.Y. The court did not grant their motions, but this
problem still bothered the court and it is a reason for
granting a ne\Y trial as gathered from statements made
by the court from the bench during arguments on the
post Yerdict motions and in chambers in the presence
of counsel of both sides.
The principal announced in the Alvarado case is,
've submit quite inapplicable to this case. In that case,
the defendant's liability depended entirely upon whether,
at the time he drove his car into the plaintiff, he was
exceeding the statutory speed limit of 25 miles per hour.
The only evidence produced by plaintiff to prove ex-
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cessive speed was a witness who estimated defendant's
speed as anywhere from 25 to 30 miles per hour. This
court held that such evidence, standing alone, left the
court with nothing but speculation and conjecture upon
which to determine defendant's speed. The reasoning
of the court was that if the only evidence as to speed is
from a witness whose testimony was that defendant was
as likely to be driving within the speed limit as it was
that he was not within the speed limit, then plaintiff
had not presented enough evidence from which a fact
finder could do anything but speculate. It is a case where
weighing evidence is impossible, and whatever decision
the fact finder made, it would rest upon nothing but conjecture and speculation.
The evidence which supports the findings that Dr.
Pemberton's services to the plaintiff were for the injuries plaintiff received on January 19, 1960, is certainly not to be considered in the same class or of the
same nature as the speculative nature of the evidence
in the Alvarado case. We first observe that there is no
need to speculate as to why plaintiff failed to respond
to Dr. Smith's invitation to return to him in case of
continuing pain and symptoms which originated on
January 19, 1960. Plaintiff explained why he didn't
return and the explanation was given while the doctor
was in the court room and before he was released as a
witness. Plaintiff testified: "'Veil, last time I was to
Dr. Smith, he told me I had arthritis in my shoulder
and that it was something I would have to live with."
(R. 382). After this testimony, the Doctor was excused
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without 1naking any effort to rebut this testimony. This
was confirmatory of testimony plaintiff gave earlier
( R . •)....r")•)) .•
~

''(~.

llow long did you keep in touch with Dr.
Smith?

1\. I went to him about 12 times.
(~.

Over what period of time?

1\. From the time of the accident until April.

Q. \ \r ould that be about the first of April?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What treatment did he prescribe for you?

.t\.. Oh, he gave me some vitamin shots and prescribed some pills, which I took.

Q. And did this help?

A. No; no-didn't to any extent.
Q. Did he encourage you to-that there was
anything else he could do for you by April I?
.L~\..

No. He told me that is all he could do and it
is just something I would have to live with
the rest of my life and that I had arthritis.

Q. Did he say where your arthritis was?

A. He said it was in the shoulder."
Before plaintiff took the stand and said what he
is here quoted as saying at R. 382, Dr. Smith, at R. 374,
on direct examination testified as follows :
'\~.

Exactly April I was the last time I saw him.

Q. And at that time, did you tell him that he
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needed no further help from you or any physician?
A. No , I told him to would take a little time
for the rest of it to get well and advised him
to wait."
The evidence as to plaintiff's pain and what he did
about it following the injury of January 19, 1960, may
be summarized as follows:
(a) Plaintiff testified that from the time of the
accident, the more he used his arm and shoulder, the
more it hurt, and consequently, he developed a tendency
of putting his left hand in his pocket and not using that
side any more than he had to. (R. 253-254).
(b) It pained him to shovel, so he a voided shovelIng. (R. 254).
(c) His arm would pain from doing most of the
duties required of him as a driver and operator of a
ready-mix truck. (R. 254).
(d) From the date of this injury, because of its
pain, he avoided overtime whenever the circumstances
of the work permitted. ( R. 259, line 28 to R. 260, line
44; also R. 260, line 20, to R. 261, line 1).
(e) Beginning with plaintiff's injury of January
19, 1960, and continuii1g to the present, with a certain
amount of relief from the operation performed by Dr.
Pemberton, Plaintiff has been unusually nervous and
irritable with his wife and children as a result of his
frayed nerves, which in turn is caused by the pain. "He
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acts like he really doesn't have any control over it," and
when he sleeps, instead of being "sound and still" as he
wns before the accident, he, since the accident, "is constnntly turning and jerking around; just moving all
night.'' (lt 350-351).
(f) Dr. i>emberton not only found and removed
an inflan1ed bursa which brought a relief to plaintiff
\vhich he had not had since the injury of January 19,
19ti0 (It. ~59, lines 2~-27; R. 299-300), but the Doctor
also found, independent of the inflamed bursa, that the
ligarnents of the '"ball" between the collar-bone and the
shoulder blade were stretched or torn and that adhesions
had formed their own scar tissue which stood between
the rnuscle layers and the ligaments around the joint,
n condition known as perio-arthritis. These adhesions,
the Doctor believed, found their origin more likely not
so n1uch from a fall or bump as from a jerking of the
muscles such as would occur when they were stimulated
by an electrical impulse. ( R. 301, lines 3-6; R. 320,
lines 22-26). This, of course, is the source of the pain
and the disability that has persisted not only since the
accident, but has also continued since the operation and
is the basis of his permanent partial disability and the
source of the pain he will have as long as he lives. (R.
301-303).
2. ~-\ second reason for granting a new trial, as

expressed by the court off the record, is that defendant
produced evidence that plaintiff had hurt his left shoulder on two or three occasions prior to January 19, 1960,
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and that this also created a causation problem in the
court's mind tending to defeat plaintiff's showing that
Dr. Pemberton's services were for injuries other than
plaintiff received on January 19, 1960.
Defendants' witness, Jacobsen, personnel manager
at Utah Sand and Gravel, testified that one of his duties
was to receive injury reports for the State Insurance
Fund ( R. 432), and that in such capacity he had received
a report from plaintiff inN ovember, 1957, which stated:
''While turning truck around in small area,
I pulled back muscles of upper back and left
shoulder''.
He is reported by this witness as not having seen
a doctor at that time. (R. 434). This witness also furnished a report that in July, 1957, plaintiff "had lifted
the mixer chute and wrenched his back," and again no
showing of plaintiff having seen a doctor. (R. 434).
Finally, in September, 1957, a report was made to
witness, Jacobsen, by Haslam and reported by the witness as follows :
"While lifting chute, fellow worker dropped
his end of chute causing patient to swing around
and be hit by a 2x4 board in left shoulder, causing pain; pain developed more when employee
returned to work Monday, 9-16-57, and was
lifting chute again".
For this injury, the witness reported, the plaintiff
saw a Dr. Parker. (R. 436).
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'fhe ,vitness, Jacobsen, also testified that none of
these injuries kept plaintiff from his work. (R. 440}.
Plaintiff. in explaining the effect of these injuries said
they ,vere rninor, and had caused him discomfort for only
a "dny or so.,, ( R. 477-478). Thus, these injuries reportt'd hy 'vitness, Jacobsen, were strictly minor accidruts and had occurred approximately 2lf2 years prior
to .January 19, 1960. This explains why plaintiff had
not testified of them earlier in the trial and also why
he had said nothing about them to Dr. Pemberton they \vere not worth the mention.
~lr.

Berry asked Dr. Pemberton that if plaintiff
had had previous injuries to the shoulder wouldn't it be
a reasonable assumption that one of those injuries had
caused the inflamed bursa. The doctor said it was possible, and that doctors always have to rely on the history the patient gives. (R. 311-312). Then later when
plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Pemberton to assume that
plaintiff had no difficulty in operating the ready-mix
truck and doing the work he was accustomed to do as
such a truck driver would he have an opinion as to what
really caused the inflamed bursa, Dr. Pemberton replied,
''I believe it 'vas, assuming that this history that I got
from him "yas true, it was my judgment, and still is,
that the inflamed bursa was due to the injury he suffered
in January, the year before I saw him-1960." (R. 318).

It is worthy of note at this point, that the bulk of
the damages awarded plaintiff by the jury was for
shoulder injuries 'vhich were independent of the in37
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flamed bursa injury. The operation corrected and cleared
up the inflamed bursa but the permanent damage to
and around the ligaments and muscles is damage that
cannot be corrected by surgery or any other treatment
now known, and is the source of his continuing pain
and disability.
Summarizing the issues under Point II, Dr. Peinberton's services corrected an inflamed bursa in the left
shoulder which was injured January 19, 1960. There is
negligible evidence submitted by the defendants Paulsen
by which it was attempted to prove that plaintiff's inflamed bursa might have happened in 1957, or possibly
in October or November of 1960. Both plaintiff and
Dr. Pemberton established the bursa pain as orginating
on January 19, 1960, and whatever the conflict as to
when the injury treated by Dr. Pemberton occurred,
such conflict was obviously a matter to be resolved by
the jury. Inasmuch as the jury gave plaintiff special
damages covering Dr. Pemberton's services, we must
conclude that the jury resolved the conflict, if any, in
favor of plaintiff. This issue in no way involved the more
serious damage in plaintiff's shoulder, for which medical
science has no cure. There is no basis here for a new trial.
POINT III
THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT AS TO
BOTH SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAM·
AGES AND NO PARrr OF THE AMOUNT
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'riii•~ItEOF

C.i\X llE .L\'f'fRIBUT-t\BLE '1,0

'l'IIE IXI~,I~UE~l'E OF P.L\SSION AND PitEJLTI>ll~E

ON Tl-IE l,AR'f OF THE JURY.

J.\ third reason for the new trial order, as expressed

hoth on the bench and in chambers, but off the record,
the court thought that the jury was under the influence
of passion and prejudice in arriving at the amount of
darnnges because the jury at first awarded the plaintiff
$50,000.00 general damages and $558.80 special damuges against the Paulsens, and only $100.00 general
dnrnages and $58.00 special damages in favor of the
J>aulsens in their action against Petersen (R. 145),
although the court had instructed the jury that damages
in the one case must be the same as in the other. When
the verdict was read, the court immediately reminded
the jury of its instruction on this point, whereupon the
jury promptly corrected the error and then rendered
its verdict the same in both cases.
\\r e can only speculate as to why the jury did what

it did in its first effort; and such speculations are not
proper or valid, simply because they are speculations,
and are not a sound basis for a new trial. If one is to
speculate, however~ it is inconceivable to us as to how
one can arrive at the inference suggested by the trial
court. In vie"· of the jury's subsequent action, wherein it made the correction and rendered judgment against
Petersen for the full amount_, there is only one reasonable inference (other than that the jury at first simply
misunderstood the court's instructions) , which is that
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the jury's first effort was probably the result of sympathy for the defendant Petersen, because he was a
laborer undoubtedly without sufficient resources to pay
a judgment of $50,000.00, or of any amount. The
jury, however, in spite of such obvious sympathy, corrected itself and rendered the verdict against him, thus
removing even the ground from which the trial court so
dubiously speculates.
When the trial court speaks of passion and prejudice, it, of course, raises the problem of whether the
evidence supports the amount of the verdict. We therefore feel obligated to discuss this problem. An excellent
statement by this court as to the principles with which
we are here involved is found in Duffy vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 118 Utah 82, 218 Pac 2d 1080:
"Previously decided cases are of little value
in fixing present day standards or in assisting
courts in determining excessive awards ... Both
the court and jury are required to deal with
many unknown factors and a good guess is about
the best that can be hoped for. The permissible
minimum and maximum limits within which a
jury may operate for a given injury are presently far apart and must continue to be wide
spread so long as pain and suffering must be
measured by many standards. If the jurors
awarded damages which all reasonable persons
would conclude were not outside permissible
limits, we cannot invade their province by substituting our judgment for theirs, but when we
believe that all reasonable minds would conclude
the limits have been exceeded, we are permitted
to correct the error".
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Surely, in the instant case, all reasonable minds
would not conclude that proper litnits have been exeecrled. 'rhc faet is that the jurors followed the evidence
Yery carefully. 1.,o attack the amount of the judgment
hnsed upon passion and prejudice of the jurors is to
ignore the evidence. The facts show that _:plaintiff's
injuries caused pain, especially from the use to which
he had to subject his arm and shoulder in his work. The
pain caused hitn to reduce his working time when it was
prnctical to do so. As often as not, he would have to
keep on working even though the work aggravated the
pain. l~ven so, there was a drop in his working time
of frotn 10 to 15 per cent. The last full year of work
under this handicap showed an actual relative loss conYerted into wages at his present rate of pay of $957.00
(Exhibit 16 P), which, with his normal life expectancy,
indicates a future wage loss of approximately $40,000.00. And this does not reflect a further loss by virtue
of taking other employment, as recommended by the
Doctor, (R. 264} which may only be temporary, but
\vhich pays less than 'vhat he actually earned in 1962.
Then. added to this is the loss of wages during the year
1961. the year he had the operation which amounted to
~1381.00 (Exhibit 16 P).
This evidence treats only of prospective and actual
,,·age loss. Dr. Pemberton said the permanent partial
disability was from 10 to 15 per cent. This presents an
interesting correlation with the percentage of his reduced
\vorking time and future wage loss.
There can be no question that the permanent par-
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tial disability of his arm relates directly to his impaired
earning capacity. His arm and shoulder hurt him when
he works and this fact, along with the weakness, is
directly responsible for his wage loss and for the advice
of his doctor to seek other employment.
The pain and suffering have taken, perhaps, even
a more serious toll in the family than the wage loss, as
serious as that is. The effect of this constant, daily irritation from pain has been to make him irritable as a
father and husband and has brought a disquieting influence and nervous strain into his home. This shows
up not only in his sharp and sudden criticism of his
children's normal behavior but also in frequent complaining about his job and of his pain, whereas before
the injury he liked his work. He used to be able to handle
his job with ease, and he had a relish for the work. After
the accident, it was a painful chore and a source of his
frequent complainings in the home. Then there was the
fact that he was a sound and restful sleeper before the
injury, but after, it was fitful and disturbed. There is
also an ugly incisional scar at the shoulder which will
always be a source of mental suffering when the shoulder is exposed to public gaze. There is also the atrophe
of the muscle around the shoulder joint which makes
the end of the clavicle more prominent and very tender.
These things are all permanent.
This court, as above quoted, has listed the elements,
any one or a combination of 'vhich have caused jurors,
quite properly, to return, in the words of the court, "very
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substantial verdicts." These elements as stated are: large
wage losses. considerable tnedical costs, permanent disubility. a loss of bodily function, prolonged pain and
suft'ering.'' ..:\fter giving this list, the court adds, "or a
l'otnbina tion of all such consequences." In the Duffy
case, frorn which this language is taken, the court found
none of these elements as listed, yet the court was willing
to pertnit $8500.00 of the general damages to stand.
In the instant case, we have all the elements listed n large "·age loss, permanent disability, loss of bodily
function, and prolonged pain and suffering. In the
l)utl'y case the court adds: "Courts in sustaining the
verdicts have given consideration to those elements of
darnuges, and in addition, to such factors as the decreased
purchasing power of the dollar, the increased cost of
living. the possible continuation of the present inflationary spiral, the social betterment of the individual, and
the humiliation flowing from the loss of limbs or any
other disfigurement."
In ,·ie'v of all the foregoing, we submit that the jury
in this case ,·ery carefully considered the evidence as
to dan1ages, and applied that evidence with considerable
cnre and judgment to the instructions of the court ir1
reaching its verdict. There was and is no evidence of
their being influenced in their judgment by passion
and prejudice.
As a final thought on this point, we mention the
important fact that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment
of punitive damages in this case, in view of the jury's
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finding of wanton and reckless conduct, if he had asked
for it. And because he did not ask for it, there has not
been a breath of talk in this case which would even suggest to the jury that they should return a verdict involving a punishment of the defendants. The record
of this case is sound and fully supports the amount
of the verdict, independent of any consideration of
punishment. When one carefully considers all the evidence one must conclude that "all reasonable P,ersons
would conclude that the damages awarded here are not
outside permissible limits"; in which case, says the court,
"We cannot invade the province of the jury by substituting our judgment for theirs."

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS ORDER GRANTING A
NEW TRIAL; AND THE JURY'S VERDICT
AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RE-INSTATED.
Plaintiff's position is that the record herein entirely
supports the verdict of the jury and the right of the
jury to render that verdict, and that the court in ordering a new trial exercised a power which was not within
its discretion, or within its constitutional right to exercise; and that it is appropriate for this court to give relief
from such order at this time by nullifying the new trial
order and by re-instating the verdict and judgment
thereon.
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In

~lontgomery

\V.ard and Company vs. Duncan,
all lTS 24:J, the United States Supreme Court states
that ltule ~>0 (b) "was adopted for the purpose of speeding litigation and prct,entiny unnecessary retrials.n
\\'here a motion to vacate a judgment raises the
san1e questions as those raised in a motion for a ne'v
trin 1. then disposition by the appellate court of an order
vacating the judgn1ent is also determinative of the new
trial order. 'fhus, if an appellate court restores to a
plaintiff the verdict and judgment which a trial court
has vacated, then the need for a new trial is eliminated.
'rhis principle 'vas recognized in Vearn vs. Crane {1940,
(' .l' .1\. 7th) , 114 Fed 896 where the court said:
''It is well known that Rule 50 (b) was promulgated largely with the view of avoiding unnecessary new trials, and it may well be that if a
motion for a directed verdict raises the same
questions as those raised by a motion for new
trial, final disposition of the motion for directed
verdict like,vise 'vill work conclusive determination of the questions presented by the motion for
new trial." See annotation 85 Law Edition, 155
at p. 172.
In Moist Cold Refrigeration Company vs. Lou
Johnson Company {1957), 249 Fed 2d 246, cert. denied,
356 lTS 968, 69 ALR 2d 540, the Ninth Circuit Court
of .L-\ppeals considered the appeal problems created
where a trial court simultaneously grants both motions
of a party asking for judgment n.o.v. together with a
new trial under Rule 50 (b). The court summarized the
possibilities open to the appellate court as follows:
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"Disposition of an appeal, where the trial
court granted both a motion for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict, and a motion for a new
trial, may take any of three alternative courses:
The appellate court may (I) Affirm the trial
court's action in granting judgment, notwithstanding the verdict; ( 2) remand the case for a
new trial, in accordance with the alternative order of the district court ; or ( 3) hold that the
alternative order granting the new trial was an
abuse of discretion and reinstate the jury verdict.n
In the instant case the trial court set aside the verdict and judgment based upon defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 50 (b). It did not grant defendants' motion
n.o.v. If under Rule 50 (b) it is proper, indeed desirable
where a trial court has abused its discretion, for the
appellate court to reinstate a judgment for plaintiff
and to nullify the new trial order where the trial court
has granted judgment to the defendant n.o.v. and also
granted a new trial, a fortiori, an appellate court can
and should re-instate the verdict and judgment, which
has only been set aside, and also nullify the new trial
order.
Even before the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
were adopted and at a time when Utah had a statute
declaring that a new trial order was not an appealable
order, this court recognized in Hirabelli vs. Daniels,
44 Utah 88, 138 Pac 1172, that an appellate court should
not withhold relief from a trial court's abuse of its discretion in granting new trials. This court said:
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"X o n1at tcr ho"· often or how 'vhimsical or
haseless the ground n1ay be on which the trial
court may set a verdict aside and grant a new
triaL nevertheless, an aggrieved party will be
contpelled to accept \vhat the court may choose
to allo\v or impose upon him or abandon his
cause or defense; for, no matter how often a case
rnay be tried, the trial court, for mere capricious
not ions that the verdict is too large or too small,
1nay set it aside until a jury is found to respond
to the court's notions of what the verdict and
damages should be; and if, perchance, the proceedings on the last trial are without error,
neither party can complain. Surely the statute
does not contemplate no relief can be granted
from such a prostitution of the constitutional
trial by a jury."
Inasmuch as one of the purposes of Rule 50 (b) is
to prevent unnecessary trials, and in view of the opinion
of the Ninth C:ircuit Court of Appeals that an appellate
court 1nay nullify a new trial order and re-instate a
judgment which has been set aside under a Rule 50 (b)
motion, the time has fully arrived for this court to give
relief from a trial court's new trial order without first
having to go through a useless retrial before obtaining
such relief.

CONCLUSION
The good sense in our request that this court act
now· in this case to give relief, rather than later, is
enhanced by the fact that neither party here contends
that a new trial 'vould produce any more or any less
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or any different evidence than is now before the court.
The same package of facts which the court now has
before it will be no different after a new trial. If there
is error in the record which has prejudiced the respondents, as they contend, this court can deal with such
errors now to a much greater advantage than later,
because without the guiding direction of this court we
have no reason to hope that the same errors of law
would not again be made in a new trial. If, on the other
hand, there is no error in the record adverse to respondents, if they have had a fair trial, if they have not been
prejudiced, and if the trial court abused its discretion
in vacating the judgment and ordering a new trial, it
would be most useless and most oppressive for plaintiff
to be subjected to a new trial before this court gives
relief. We appeal for relief now.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PARK SMOOT
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
417 Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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